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Cookies

A 5-post collection

Promiscuous Cookies and Their Impending Death via the SameSite Policy

Cookies like to get around. They have no scruples about where they go save for some basic constraints relating to the origin from which they were set. I mean have a think about it: If a website sets a cookie then you click a link to another page on that same site, will the cookie be automatically sent with the request? Yes. What if an attacker sends you a link to that same website in a malicious email and you click that link, will the cookie be sent? Also yes. Last one: what if an attacker di...

These Cookie Warning Shenanigans Have Got to Stop

This will be short, ranty and to the point: these warnings are getting ridiculous: I know, tell you something you don't know! The whole ugly issue reared its head again on the weekend courtesy of the story in this tweet: > I’m not sure if this makes it better or worse... “Cookie walls don't comply with GDPR, says Dutch DPA”: https://t.co/p0koRdGrDB — Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) March 8, 2019 [https://twitter.com/troyhunt/status/1104153598458396672?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw] The reason I don't know if i...

5 ways to tackle an insufficient HTTPS implementation

Earlier this year I wrote about 5 ways to implement HTTPS in an insufficient manner (and leak sensitive data) [https://www.troyhunt.com/2013/04/5-ways-to-implement-https-in.html]. The entire premise of the post was that following a customer raising concerns about their SSL implementation, Top CashBack went on to assert that everything that needed to be protected, was. Except it wasn’t, at least not sufficiently and that’s the rub with SSL; it’s not about having it or not having it, it’s about un...

How to build (and how not to build) a secure “remember me” feature

This content is now available in the Pluralsight course "Secure Account Management Fundamentals" [http://www.pluralsight.com/courses/secure-account-management-fundamentals] Here’s the scenario – a user logs in to your website, comes back tomorrow and… has to log in again. The idea of the “remember me” feature – and let’s face it, we’ve all seen this before – is that their authenticated state is persisted beyond the immediate scope of use. What this means is that they can close the browser, turn...

C is for cookie, H is for hacker – understanding HTTP only and Secure cookies

Since a very young age, many of us have been taught that C is for cookie [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ye8mB6VsUHw] and that apparently, “That’s good enough for me”. Except it’s not – the hidden depths of the cookie were never really explored so is it any wonder that after being ingrained with such a trivial view of cookies from such a young age that so many of us are handling them in an insecure fashion? You see, there’s far more to cookies than meets the eye and I want to delve into a coupl...